The 1991 Civil Rights Act moved rapidly through its first House committees under the guidance of their chairmen.' 8 On March 12, the House Education and Labor Committee, chaired by Representative William D. Ford (D-Mich.), approved H.R. 1 by a voice vote.' 9 The House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, chaired by Representative Don Edwards (DCal.), also approved the bill on the same date. 20 The bill was then approved may argue as an affirmative defense to a disparate impact charge that the challenged criteria are a "business necessity." Id. at 431. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) , the Court reinterpreted several aspects of disparate impact theory, thus raising numerous questions about the proper interpretation of business necessity doctrine. These issues included the extent to which business necessity would require that disputed hiring criteria be related to successful job performance, the location of the burden of proof of business necessity, and the specificity with which complaining employees or job applicants would have to pinpoint the employment practices that caused the disparate impact. President Bush's assertion that the 1990 bill would lead to hiring and promotional quotas was based on his interpretation of how the bill addressed these issues within the business necessity standard. See 136 CONG. REC. S16,418-19 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990) [B] oth sides are much further apart than they were when negotiations to forge a compromise bill collapsed last fall.").
18. Most bills are examined and "marked up" by congressional subcommittees and committees with jurisdiction over them. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., How CONGRESS WORKS 41-42 (1983) [hereinafter How CONGRESS WORKS] (describing bill's progress through congressional committees). Committee jurisdiction can be ambiguous, and referrals may therefore reflect the political assessments of the majority leadership as to which committees will be friendlier to the legislation. See TIEFER, supra note 1, at 110-33 (discussing committee jurisdiction, referrals, and multiple referrals). Bills may also be drafted using specific language in attempts to assure the jurisdiction of a particular committee. Id. at 114-18. Bills may be amended any number of times by committees and subcommittees. When a committee has finally decided on a version of the bill it supports, it sends the bill, accompanied by a committee report, to the floor of the congressional chamber. How CONGRESS WORKS, supra, at 41-42; see also discussion of Rules Committee infra note 24.
19 Committee rejected the substitute versions of the bill proposed by committee Republicans for the Bush Administration. 23 Remaining differences between the Education and Labor Committee and the Judiciary Committee versions of the bill were to be reconciled in the House Rules Committee. 4 The Civil Rights Act's smooth progress through Congress was to end there. Since December of 1990, civil rights activists had been negotiating over the bill's language with the Business Roundtable, a coalition representing about 200 large U.S. corporations, in the hope of crafting an acceptable compromise that the two-thirds of Congress needed to override a near-certain presidential veto could support.' On April 9, White House Counsel C. Boyden Gray informed the negotiating business leaders of the Bush Administration's disapproval of the talks; 26 the talks broke down several days later. Negotiators on both sides later charged that the talks had been scuttled by the White House, specifically by C. Boyden Gray and Chief of Staff John Sununu.
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Hopes for a bipartisan, White House-supported civil rights bill were shaken, and the bill's passage seemed in jeopardy.
In the next month, several compromise versions of the Civil Rights Act were developed, including a substitute proposed jointly by Representative 24. Most bills that reach the floor of the House of Representatives must first travel through the House Rules Committee, where they are given a "special rule" that sets limits on the time for debate and the number of amendments allowed. The Rules Committee's powers include "screening out some controversial bills, structuring floor consideration including deciding what amendments to allow, and settling jurisdictional disputes." TIEFER, supra note I. at 252.
25. Negotiating for the Business Roundtable were business leaders from the American Express Co. AT&T, and the Business Roundtable itself. Negotiating for civil rights groups were representatives from the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the Women's Legal Defense Fund. the NAACP. the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the National Women's Law Center. and the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights. Sharon LaFraniere & Gary Lee. White House Lobbies Businesses on Rights Bill. WASH POST. 1991, at A16.
26. LaFraniere & Lee. supra note 25, at A7 (noting "White House's growing concern that the Democrats and business groups will unite on an antidiscnmination bill and gain enough momentum in Congress to override a presidential veto"); see also Sharon LaFramere. Busmeses Reject Talks on Rights Bill. Citing Bush Stance, WASH. POST, May 3. 1991. at Al. Al I ("IClorporate executives feel White House opposition will doom any compromise they could come up with. according to business sources Roundtable representatives say they see no point in resuming talks unless Bush alters his stance,"] 27. LaFraniere, supra note 26. at Al l; LaFraniere & Lee. supra note 25. at A7, Pnscilla Painton. bill, and Representative Fish, ranking minority member of the House Judiciary Committee. The substitute, announced on May 21,28 included three important provisions. First, it added a provision explicitly stating that the bill neither required nor pernitted quotas. Second, it reinserted the cap on punitive damages available for intentional sex discrimination that had passed both chambers in 1990. Third, the Brooks-Fish substitute altered the language concerning the "business necessity" defense available to defendants in disparate impact lawsuits.
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The House Rules Committee convened on May 29 and 30 to write a Rule for H.R. 1.30 Judiciary Committee Chairman Brooks and nine other Representatives testified before the committee at that time . 3 The resulting Rule-House Resolution 162 (H.R. Res. 162)-provided for the House to resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole 32 for three hours of general debate on the bill, to be equally divided between the minority and majority parties. The Rule then called for the amendment process to begin, with only three substitute amendments in order, and no amendments in order on those amendments.3 The amendments would be considered in a "King of the Hill" fashion, meaning that whichever of the proposed substitute amendments passed last would prevail. 35 The three substitutes would be voted upon in specified order: first, the Towns-Schroeder substitute, which replaced H.R. I with the original, more liberal, version of the Civil Rights Act that had passed the House Education and Labor Committee in 1990; second, the Michel substitute, proposed by House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R-Ill.), which replaced H.R. 1 with H.R. 1375, the Administration's bill; and, last, the recently developed Brooks-Fish compromise substitute. 36 Rule. 46 The motion passed 259 to 165 in a party-line vote, with no Republicans voting in favor of the motion and only one Democrat voting against it. 7 The House then voted on the Rule itself. H.R. Res. 162 passed by a vote of 247 to 175 with similar partisan support: 6 Republicans in favor and 159 opposed, 240 Democrats in favor and 16 opposed. 8 Once the House had agreed to the Rule for H.R. 1, the bill itself advanced without procedural complications. Pursuant to H.R. Res. 162, the House rose and resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 4 9 for consideration of H.R. 1, with Representative Kwesi Mfume (D-Md.) as its chair. 5 " Representative Mfume recognized the bill's lead sponsor, Representative Brooks, as majority floor manager and Representative Henry Hyde (R-Ill.) as minority floor manager for three hours of general debate, equally divided. 5 ' After the debate, the Committee of the Whole turned to the Towns-Schroeder amendment, which it debated for one hour and rejected by a vote of 152 to 277.52 The Committee next debated the Michel substitute for one hour, and voted to reject it, 162 to 266.
5 ' Representative Brooks then successfully moved that the Committee rise for that evening. 54 The next day, June 5, 1991, the House again resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole to consider the Brooks-Fish substitute amendment. After one hour of debate, the amendment passed by a vote of 264 to 166. 5 ' The amended version of the bill then passed by voice vote, and the Committee of the Whole rose and reported H.R. 1 back to the House. 6 The House then voted on the passage of H.R. 1; the bill passed by a vote of 273 to 158., 5 Despite the efforts of the bill's supporters, the count was fifteen votes short of the two-thirds majority needed for an override vote. 58 H.R. 1 was read for the first time on the Senate floor on June 11, 1991.
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The Senate did not attach much importance to the bill, however, because of 7 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 passed the Senate by a vote of 93 to 52" Because of the highly contested language alterations that had occurred during the bill's passage, the Senate approved a three-paragraph "interpretive memorandum" that explained the Act's use of the term "business necessity."" On October 29, the Senate agreed by voice vote to direct all courts to the three paragraphs for resolution of any interpretive questions. 9 0 At least one scholar has pointed to this congressional failure (or refusal) to resolve statutorily one of the difficult definitional problems of the Act as an explanation for its passage:
The key to the compromise was the bill's failure to conclusively define business necessity. Instead, by reference to an interpretive memo, the 1991 Act said that judicial interpretation of "business necessity" should be governed by the "concepts enunciated by ... 84. See generally How CONGRESS WORKS. supra note 18. at 41 (descnbing resolutions expressing "sense" or opinion of chambers). The fact that "'sense-of-thc-Scnate" resolutions do not have the force of law suggests that S. Res. 209 was passed to respond quickly and easily to the political pressure generated by Anita Hill's allegations of sexual harassment.
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Full procedural histories of the passages of the 1960 and 1964 Civil Rights
Acts appear in numerous books and articles on the subject. 99 This summary therefore does not discuss extensively the events and politics shaping the bills. Instead, this Part focuses on specific procedural issues that arose during the passages of the Acts for purposes of comparison with procedural events that marked the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1960
During the 1959 session of the Eighty-Sixth Congress, attempts at passing a civil rights act came up short. Recalcitrant committee chairs in both the 93 . See, e.g., id. at H9506 (statement of Rep. McDermott) (stating that Wards Cove workers' "quest for justice will be sacrificed on George Bush's altar of racial politics"); id. at H9509 (statement of Rep. Mink) (stating that Wards Cove exemption "debases the very title of this bill"); id. at H9511 (statement of Rep. Schroeder) (insisting that "special interest legislation in a civil rights bill is absolutely intolerable"); id. (statement of Rep. Mineta) (calling Wards Cove exemption "one of the most outrageous pieces of special interest legislation I have ever seen"). The Wards Cove exemption was inserted into the Senate bill on November 5 by a special corrective resolution, S. Res. 214. Id. at S15,950-68 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991). ). This exemption is extraordinary because it precludes relief for a group of plaintiffs whose efforts were a crucial causal factor in creating the need for the legislation.
94 Senators-fifteen more than were necessary to bring a vote on cloture to the Senate floor' 3 -filed a cloture petition. 114 The vote two days later fell far short of two-thirds: Only forty-two Senators supported cloture while fifty-three opposed it."
5 The filibuster continued, and as pressure for a more moderate civil rights bill mounted, eyes turned toward the House to see what sort of bill the Representatives could pass." 6 The House of Representatives was still facing the same obstacle as in 1959-Rules Committee Chairman Howard Smith-and was still attempting to use the same weapon to wrest civil rights legislation from his control: the discharge petition. Under House Rule XXVII(4), discharge petitions could be filed by any House member once a bill had stood before any committee for more than thirty days or before the Rules Committee for seven days." 7 Such petitions required the signatures of a majority of House members (218) to succeed."' Liberal Democrats had acquired only 175 signatures on their discharge petition for H.R. 8601 when the names were leaked to The New York Times and promptly printed on January 22, 1960."' Because the petition was signed by 145 Democrats but only 30 Republicans, House Republicans suddenly came under great pressure to add their signatures to the petition to avoid appearing as though they were stalling the civil rights bill.' 2 0 When the number of signatures on the petition grew so that it seemed he might actually lose control of the bill, Chairman Smith finally gave in and announced hearings on H.R. This political battle continued until the threat of the third removal method broke the deadlock. House Rule XI(25) allows any three members of a committee to call for a meeting of that committee." ° If after seven days the committee has not yet met, a majority of the committee members may request that the clerk of the committee schedule a committee meeting immediately.' 6 ' When the Rules Committee's ranking Republican member Clarence J. Brown (R-Ohio) began to consider siding with liberal Democrats to use Rule XI to force Chairman Smith to begin hearings, Smith finally gave in. 62 The hearings on H.R. 7152 began on January 9, 1964.163
The hearings before the Rules Committee lasted for the better part of a month, with twenty-nine Southern Representatives testifying before the Committee in opposition to the bill." 6 Finally, when there were no further witnesses, Chairman Smith could hold off a vote on the bill no longer. On January 30, the Rules Committee reported H.R. 7152 out of committee,65 by a vote of 11 to 4, with only Southern Democrats opposing. The committee members voted 7 to 4 to conduct all hearings in one day, 224 however, and then voted 10 to 5 to grant a Rule for H.R. Res. 789 that allowed only one hour of debate and required that the bill be immediately reported to the House. 2 " Furthermore, the committee members went so far as to invoke a committee rule permitting any committee member to report a Rule to the House if the chair refuses to do so, effectively stripping the bill away from Chairman Smith. 226 On 
A. Reforms of Seniority Rules and Committee Leadership
The largest obstacles that confronted the 1960 and 1964 Civil Rights Acts were committee chairs who wielded their disproportionate power to block the bills' progress. 230 These Southern Democratic chairs opposed civil rights legislation, and although they held their leadership positions because of the Democratic majority in both chambers of Congress, on civil rights issues they worked against the majority of those Democratic members by consistently joining Republicans to block legislation.
Unsurprisingly, most Democratic members responded to this situation with reforms that diminished the control of committee chairs over the legislative
agenda. As David Rohde states in Parties and Leaders in the Postreform
House, newly elected liberal members of that era "found institutional arrangements (especially the disproportionate powers of committee chairmen) to be biased against their interests and in favor of those of the 'conservative coalition.' They sought to redress the institutional imbalance through the reforms of the 1970's, which weakened chairmen and strengthened the majority party. ' 2 3 1 These reforms also redistributed power among more members of Congress, so that the Democratic congressional leadership became more disparate and more representative of its membership.
The passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act demonstrates the importance of these reforms. Rather than fighting the Democratic leadership, 1991 subcommittee and committee chairs worked with it to pass their common legislative agenda. Although the voting patterns of the conservative coalition remained unchanged, the Democratic majority was no longer held its 232 captive.
230. See supra part 11. HOLSE 162 (1991) 232. The conservative coalition did still exist as a voing bloc. ho .eer, and greatly increased the difficulty of passing the 1991 Act. For example, the bloc prevented House passage of H.R I by the twothirds needed to render a presidential veto inconsequential. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58
DAVID v. ROHDE-PARTIES AND LEADERS IN "TE POSTREFORm
When the Civil Rights Acts of 1960 and 1964 were before Congress, they faced a body steeped in tradition, particularly the influential tradition of committee leadership by seniority. As Tiefer explains, before the 1970's, "the iron rule of seniority made selection of the most senior Member as chair automatic. 233 In 1964, 95% of all House committees were chaired by their most senior members; in the Senate, that figure was 100%.2"
Despite their facial neutrality, congressional seniority rules produced an observable political bias in both chambers in the early 1960's. Given the relative volatility of Northern Democratic congressional seats compared to Southern ones, Southern Democrats were disproportionately represented among the most senior members of Congress and thus dominated the leadership of most congressional committees2 35 As documented by Mack C. Shelley II, in 1960, 63% of Senate committees and 65% of House committees were chaired by Southern Democrats; in 1964, the respective figures were 63% and 60%. 236 Indeed, Shelley's data reveal percentages of comparable magnitude for several consecutive decades. 237 This disproportionate power distribution survived into the mid-1970's; in 1974, the numbers were 47% and 43%, respectively. 235. GEORGE B. GALLOWAY, HISTORY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 83 (1976) (analyzing regional distribution of chairships); SHELLEY, supra note 4, at 67 (documenting "the classic era of committee dominance by senior Southerners protected by uncompetitive elections and generally not answerable to the official party leadership"); TIEFER, supra note I, at 102 (noting that senior conservative Southern Democrats dominated committee chairships). 239. Prior to the 1970's, there had been some effort to diminish the importance of seniority. For example, in 1953, the Senate Democratic Steering Committee approved what came to be known as the "Johnson Rule," named for Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, which required that every Democratic Senator be given a seat on one major committee before any could get a seat on a second major committee. How CONGRESS WORKS, supra note 18, at 110; see also SMIrrH and mandated that House and Senate committee roll-call votes be recorded in the committee reports.
2 6 In addition, the 1970 Act significantly limited the power of senior Senators, who were restricted to membership on only two major and one minor committee and allowed to chair no more than one full committee and one subcommittee of a major committee. 244. Although this Note focuses on reforms that remained intact in 1991. not all of the reforms of the 1970's have lasted up to the present day. Proxy voting, a process that increases the pou er of committee chairs by allowing them to hold and cast the votes of absent committee members. uas one such reform Currently, voting by proxy is not allowed on the floors of either the House or the Senate. but until the beginning of the 104th Congress, it was allowed in the committees of both chambers l1o%% CoGRi.ss WORKS, supra note 18. at 92. The 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act stinctly curtailed pro%) ,oting. prohibiting the practice unless committee rules specifically sanctioned it. in uhich case the proxies had to be limited to a specific issue and authorized in writing. id. In 1974. the House soted to ban prox) ,oting altogether, but this prohibition was revised in 1975 to allow once again committees to permit the use of specific proxies. H.R. Doc would be recommended individually instead of as a slate, and that the Caucus would debate and vote on any nomination at the request of ten committee members. 248 The 1971 changes included two other provisions that directly diminished the power of House committee chairs: (1) a rule limiting subcommittee chairships to one per member, thus opening up leadership positions for more junior members, 249 and (2) a rule allowing subcommittee chairs to hire one staff member each, rather than leaving all hiring in the hands of the full committee chair25 0 Republican House members enacted reforms similar to those of the Democrats on the same day, allowing their chairs or ranking minority members on each committee to be selected not strictly by seniority but by a secret ballot vote of the Republican Conference. 25 In 1973, the House Democratic Caucus ratified yet another round of reforms. 2 These included: (1) automatic Caucus votes on committee chairs, by secret ballot if demanded by twenty percent of the Caucus;2 53 (2) the creation of a new Steering and Policy Committee within the Caucus to consider party policy positions; and (3) the "Subcommittee Bill of Rights," which guaranteed subcommittee jurisdiction, referral of legislation to subcommittees, and votes on nominees for subcommittee chairs in order of seniority.2 4 These reforms all decreased the power of committee chairs and increased the autonomy and power of subcommittee chairs. z 5 Senate Republican reforms followed the same trend: In 1973 the Republican Caucus agreed that the Republicans on each committee would nominate their ranking members. 6 In 1974, the House Democratic Caucus reassigned the responsibility for committee chair nominations from the Democratic Committee 
B. Effects of the Refonns of Seniority Rules and Committee Leadership
The immediate impact of the 1970's reforms on congressional behavior was significant. After the Democratic Caucus had tested the power of the reforms by unseating three committee chairs in 1974, one junior House member reported that freshman members had reason to believe that senior committee leaders could no longer afford to ignore their concerns.2 6 In addition, Richard P. Conlon, staff director of the Democratic Study Group, asserted in 1972 that the reform instituting recorded teller votes in the Committee of the Whole had forced chairs to consider the opinions of "'the entire membership of the House,"' rather than merely those of the more conservative members of the Committee of the Whole. 266 This trend has also continued to the present day; today half of the members of the House Democratic Caucus are subcommittee chairs. 267 As Professors Dodd and Oppenheimer assert, "the reforms of the 1970-1975 period [were] the key in guaranteeing subcommittee influence in the House," since those reforms mandated a minimum of sixteen new subcommittee chairs. 268 The reforms not only changed the composition of congressional leadership 269 but also democratized that leadership through forced redistribution of leadership positions.
Moreover, these procedural reforms altered the way congressional leadership controlled the legislative agenda. This change is most evident in the case of the House Rules Committee and its obstructionist role in 1960 and 1964 compared to its role in 1991. The House Rules Committee had been the subject of procedural reforms before the changes of the early 1970's detailed above. 27 In addition, in 1975, the House Democratic Caucus adopted a Caucus rule giving the House Speaker the power to appoint the chair and Democratic members of the Rules Committee, subject to ratification by the Caucus. 27 ' According to many authors, this change brought the Rules Committee more firmly under the command of House leadership and "loosened the conservative coalition's grip on the panel.
- If the 1975 reform allowing secret ballot votes on Senate committee chairs had been in place already, Eastland might have been forced to respond to the concerns of other Democratic Senators, rather than allowed to side so readily with Republicans. In addition, the shape of the entire 1991 Democratic leadership could be considered a product of the reforms of the 1970's: Because of the limits on the number of chairs members could hold, more 1991 members were senior members and leaders of committees and subcommittees. The fact that the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act was eased by a Democratic leadership much closer ideologically to the wishes of the majority of Democratic members demonstrates the effect of this redistribution of power.
C. Changes in Senate Cloture Procedures
Another aspect of congressional procedure that has been the subject of numerous reforms is the Senate cloture rule, Senate Rule XXII. 8, 1963) ).
287. ORFIELD, supra note 137. at 44 (stating that filibuster rule usually biases lcgislati.e process against liberal attempts to change status quo). It could be argued that the role of the filibuster as a conservative tool against liberal initiatives has simply been a function of the near-continuous minority status of the Republican party in the Senate in recent decades. Because they were in the minority. Republicans and conservative Democrats used the filibuster as their only consistently potent wseapon against a more liberal agenda. Thus, it might be argued that we should now expect to see the filibuster become the tool of liberal Democrats, as they rely on it to block conservative initiatives of the Republican majority in the 104th Congress. This argument can support Orfield's assertion, however, if one uses the term consersative not so much to denote political party, but rather in its more essential sense--as conserving the status quo If Democrats of the 104th Congress use the filibuster against the Republican majority, they will probably be doing so in order to preserve the current status quo from the proposed changes of the Republicans' "Contract with America." Thus, the filibuster will still be used as a means of blocking legislation by those who wish to preserve the status quo.
288 all action on a bill after cloture has been invoked, in order to eliminate postcloture filibusters; 294 in 1986, this cap was shortened to thirty hours.
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It is uncertain whether the three-fifths cloture rule facilitated the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. It is true that a filibuster was less of a threat in 1991 than during the passages of the 1960 and 1964 Acts, because a 1991 filibuster could have been overcome by only sixty votes. By the time cloture was finally invoked in 1991, however, extraordinary political events had created a need for compromise that allowed the motion to pass overwhelmingly. 296 Furthermore, as is often the case when different parties control the White House and Congress, the possibility of a presidential veto in 1991 transformed the requirement of a simple majority to pass legislation. When a presidential veto is imminent, two-thirds of the Congress must pass a law to escape the veto threat. Given President Bush's 1990 veto and his threats of a veto throughout 1991, it seemed as though two-thirds of the Senate would be required for passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In that situation, the cloture rule change from requiring two-thirds of the Senators to requiring only three-fifths would have had little visible effect. Thus, despite the important 1975 reform of Senate cloture rules, the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act does not readily demonstrate the impact of this reform. This circumstance serves as a reminder that congressional reforms do not operate in a vacuum: Presidential support of, or opposition to, legislation can often trump the power of congressional procedural reforms. Procedural reforms are a potent means of changing Congress, but our system of checks and balances limits their impact.
IV. CONCLUSION
The passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act resulted from the confluence of many factors. Significant developments in political climate and race relations undoubtedly contributed to some differences between the legislative struggles of 1960, 1964, and 1991. Similarly, specific political events in the autumn of 1991 helped to precipitate the Act's passage.
In addition, procedural changes of the 1970's played an essential role in the 1991 bill's progress. The reforms of the 1970's were enacted by liberal Democrats and moderate Republicans in an effort to wrest control of legislation away from a minority conservative coalition of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans. That coalition exists as a visible, growing camp in many legislative battles today. The passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, however, demonstrates that the camp had fewer procedural weapons at its disposal in 1991 than it did in the 1960's, as a direct result of the procedural 294. TIEFER, supra note 1, at 724. 295. S. DOC. No. I, supra note 77, at 22; TIEFER, supra note I, at 724. 296. See supra text accompanying notes 79-82. reforms of the 1970's. By loosening the tradition of seniority and altering the rules for committee leadership, reformers weakened a leadership system that had become a structural impediment to civil rights legislation. Furthermore, by changing the process of appointment to the House Rules Committee, House Democratic reformers turned the Rules Committee into an instrument of the leadership rather than of Democrats aligned with the minority party. These reforms aided the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act by empowering friendly committee leaders who were eager to move the bill to the chamber floors.
The reforms also increased the representativeness of congressional leadership. Traditions of seniority in committee chairship appointments and disproportionate power held by committee chairs had functioned as antidemocratic forces in the heart of one of our nation's most democratic institutions. The ability of committee chairs to prevent votes on pieces of legislation that target issues of national concern and that are supported by the majority of members of Congress is troubling at best, and fundamentally antidemocratic at worst. The procedural reforms of the 1970's by no means eliminated the opportunities for this kind of obstruction, but they certainly diminished such opportunities. Thus, in 1991, the battles over the Civil Rights Act were waged on the chamber floors, not in debates over whether the bill would be allowed onto the floor or through invisible committee delays. This shift in the locus of political debate had a profound democratizing effect on both Congress and legislation. The weakening of the minority's chokehold on Congress was therefore the most significant contribution of the reforms of the 1970's.
With the election of the 104th Congress creating a Republican majority in both chambers for the first time in decades, congressional procedural rules have assumed renewed prominence. Indeed, House Speaker Newt Gingrich made changes in House procedure an early priority for the 104th Congress. Gingrich seems to have learned the lessons of the 19 7 0's reforms and is mimicking those reforms' consolidation of the Speaker's power over committee chairs by eliminating proxy voting in committee,-imposing term limits on committee chairships, 2 98 and at times disregarding seniority in nominating c.
2 9 The Senate, however, is not folloving the same trend, committee chairs.
Th eae oeer sntfloin h aeted it seems to be retaining committee leadership by seniority, even in the face of recent controversy surrounding Senator Jesse Helms.' How these new reforms will affect legislation remains to be seen. The conservative coalition that was the target of the reforms of the 1970's now constitutes, at least for the next two years, the dominant majority in both chambers of Congress. These next two years will therefore provide an opportunity to see how factions within the Republican majority will develop as compared to those within former Democratic majorities, and how such factions will use procedural tools and reforms to enlarge their power. The politics will differ, but the importance of procedure will not. sparked a controversy in late November 1994, by stating that the military did not support President Clinton and that the President would need a bodyguard if he visited North Carolina. Clymer, supra, at Al.
